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 Chevron’s Gift of CSR: Moral Economies of Connection and Disconnection in a 
transnational Bangladeshi village 
 
Abstract 
Based on ethnographic material gathered from villages surrounding the Bibiyana gas 
field  operated by Chevron in NE Bangladesh, this paper explores the apparent paradox 
between the corporation’s programmes of development and the response of residents 
who insist that the company ‘should do more. ’ The paper draws upon theories of the 
development gift which focus upon the ethics and moralities of corporate giving and the 
ways in which development gifts extend capitalist power, re-embed morality in the 
market and bind recipients into hierarchical positions of unequal exchange.  In contrast, 
we know significantly less about the moralities and motivations of the populations to 
whom the gifts are offered.  Aiming to fill the lacunae, the paper shows how at Bibiyana 
the ‘Community Engagement’ programmes take place in a specific moral terrain which 
predates the arrival of Chevron and has profoundly affected how their development 
goods are perceived, utilised and contested.  Whilst Chevron’s ‘Community Engagement’ 
programme is underlain by ethics of detachment (Cross, 2011) and aims to create 
disconnection via discourses of empowerment and sustainability, this  is at odds with  
the local moral economy of connection, which is underlain by the ethics of Islamic 
charity and patronage, in which hierarchical differences are explicit. 
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 March, 2008. I am sitting in the yard of Halema Bibi as she shows me a slab latrine to be 
fitted at the back of her house, one of the poorest in Talukpur, a village next to the 
Bibiyana Gas Field in Nabiganj, North East Bangladesh 1. This, like the concrete pillars of 
her brother’s place opposite is stamped with the logo Chevron. Next to the slab latrine is 
a smoke free chula (stove), also marked with the company’s logo. It’s too small for lakri 
(firewood) Halima tells me; she doesn’t use it. I ask what she thinks of the American 
corporation. In an effort to create local good will the company has embarked upon a 
programme of ‘Community Engagement’ including gifts of development such as building 
materials, slab latrines and chulas to the poorest households. Halema’s face darkens. 
Chevron is looting resources, she says angrily; they give nothing. It is a remark I have 
heard many times from different people; later, when I recount it to the NGO workers 
tasked by Chevron to distribute their development largess, they too react with 
irritation.  The problem is not the gifts, they say, but those that receive them, for ‘the 
people are too demanding.’  
In what follows I explore the apparent paradox between Chevron ‘s programmes of 
‘Community Engagement’, which alongside building materials and stoves included 
micro credit and training aimed at ‘empowerment’, and the response of a population 
who deny that they have benefitted or insist that the company ‘should do more. ’ In so 
doing, I draw upon an emerging literature in the anthropology of development which 
uses theories of the gift to explicate the social and political relations of development (cf. 
Stirrat and Henkel, 1997; Korf et al, 2010; Yeh, 2013; Cross, 2014). In particular, my 
discussion is located in debates surrounding the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes  of extractive industries, offered as an appeasing gift to populations in the 
areas where mining takes place (Rajak, 2011; Welker, 2012; 2014; Shever, 2012; 
Frynas, 2005; Kapelus, 2002; Kirsch, 2014).  As Cross observes, this work focusses 
largely upon the ethics and moralities of corporate giving, describing how the gifts 
extend capitalist power, re-embedding morality in the market and binding recipients 
into hierarchical positions of unequal exchange.  What we know less about are the 
moralities and motivations of the populations to whom the gifts (or programmes of 
development) are offered (Cross, 2014: 214).  
In contrast, in this paper I show how in Bibiyana ‘Community Engagement’ programmes 
take place in a specific moral terrain which predates the arrival of Chevron and has 
profoundly affected how their development goods are perceived, utilised and contested.  
Indeed, whilst Chevron’s ‘Community Engagement’ programme is underlain by ethics of 
detachment (Cross, 2011) and aims to create disconnection via discourses of 
empowerment and sustainability, this  is at odds with  the local moral economy of 
connection, which is underlain by the ethics of Islamic charity and patronage, in which 
hierarchical differences are explicit. 
                                                          
1 Like the names of informants, village names have been anonymised. 
Before proceeding I should mention that the gas field was developed next to the village 
where I have doing fieldwork since 1987 (Gardner, 1995; 2008; 2012), an area of 
sustained long term transnational migration to the UK and elsewhere. This paper arises 
partly from my long term research on transnational migration but more centrally from a 
project funded by the ESRC-DFID on the effects of the gas field on transnational 
networks and livelihoods in which I worked alongside three researchers from 
Jahangirngar University: Zahir Ahmed, Fatema Bashir and Masud Rana. Our research 
involved fieldwork in two villages which focussed on household livelihoods and coping 
strategies, interviews with political leaders in Bangladesh and the UK, interviews and 
group discussions with transnational villages in the U.K and with Chevron officials and 
NGO workers in Bibiyana and Dhaka, as well as participant observation, and took place 
over 2008-11.  It should be noted that the situation recounted here is part of a complex 
and continually unfolding story; what follows is based on a particular period of time and 
doesn’t cover the expansion of the gas field, which took place after 2011. 
 
The Development Gift and CSR 
In their seminal article ‘The Development Gift’ Stirrat and Henkel argue that despite 
international development orthodoxies of ‘partnership’ which imply equality and 
sameness, development gifts which use NGOs as intermediaries mark difference and 
hierarchy between givers and receivers; whilst purporting to be non-reciprocated and 
‘without strings’ such gifts are heavy with power and serve to exacerbate dependency 
and patronage (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997). This argument has been developed by 
anthropologists focussing on the gifts of mining corporations. Dinah Rajak, for example, 
analyses the programmes carried out by the Anglo-American mining company in South 
Africa.  Rather than business being amoral, Rajak argues, CSR brings morality into 
business practice, allowing mining companies to extend moral authority over the places 
where extraction takes place via discourses that stress partnership, responsibility and 
so on. Not only do global codes of ethics act as a form of governmentality they also 
naturalise neoliberal tenets such as entrepreneurship and the role of the market whilst 
eliding questions of power and ecology. Yet whilst CSR discourses of ‘partnership’, 
‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ allow the company to avoid charges of patronage,  on 
the ground the politics of the gift remain, sometimes forging alliances and reducing 
conflict but always with the power relations of giver and receiver intact (Rajak, 2011).   
In Bibiyana, similar contradictions mark Chevron’s programmes, which both attempt to 
avoid patronage by creating ‘sustainable’ programmes yet also extend and naturalise 
Chevron’s control over the area. Key to the programme are ‘Alternative Livelihood’ 
projects, which are based on the grass-roots approaches of micro-credit, small scale 
entrepreneurship and ‘empowerment’ pioneered by Bangladeshi NGOs such as the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank (cf Cons and 
Papricki, 2010; Karim, 2011; Lewis, 2011 and 2004; White, 1999) in which ideologies of 
self-help, sustainability  and neo-liberal subjectivities feature large (cf Ong, 2006; Li, 
2007; Rose, 2005). Yet whilst one requirement of such programmes is that they gain 
ethical virtue for the corporation and submerge the hierarchical differences of the 
exchange, another is that the gift be reciprocated in the form of public displays of 
gratitude, in which development goods are ceremonially handed over to the grateful 
poor.  
Other research reminds us that security concerns often overshadow the desire for 
ethical virtue (Zalik, 2004; Welker, 2009; 2012; 2014). Here, despite their packaging in 
the language of partnership and empowerment, and the ‘smiling face’ with which they 
are offered (Shever, 2010; 2012) the gifts of development offered by mining 
corporations are a territorial strategy and a technique to counter opposition. As this 
work demonstrates, nowadays PR savvy extractive industries  ‘want to cuddle’ (Burton, 
2002) offering a range of donations which attempt to rebrand the corporation as 
compassionate, caring, in partnership with ‘local communities’ (Zilak, 2004; Rajak, 
2009; 2011) or refracting the discourses of environmentalism with which they are 
critiqued to suggest that they are protecting the environment and contributing to local 
culture (Welker, 2009; Rogers, 2012; Kirsch, 2010). Meanwhile, even as these 
manoeuvres result in increased conflict, violence and struggle the programmes ensure 
that the reputation of the corporation is left intact (see in particular Welker, 2009; Zilak, 
2004). 
Whilst this valuable work demonstrates how gifts of  CSR reproduce capitalist power, 
controlling and disciplining whilst simultaneously creating binding social relationships 
between givers and receivers, its focus is largely upon the operations and ethical 
impulses of the mining corporations rather than the cultural and moral contexts in 
which the programmes take place.  As Jamie Cross points out, in these accounts the 
exchange can appear to be ‘remarkably one sided and remarkably stable. …the only 
happenings, meanings and consequences worth recording appear to be those that can 
be entered into a corporate balance sheet or appear as indices of profit.’ (2014: 126).  In 
contrast, Cross argues that corporate gifting can be also be read as a means by which 
both givers and receivers perform and create identities and personhood. In his 
ethnography of the gifts of gold coins by the Worldwide Diamonds factory to their 
employees in South India, for example, he shows how within the perspectives of the 
employees the gift invokes kingship, caste and religion in ways that reinforce and 
recreate inter caste relations, implying that Worldwide Diamonds was finally behaving 
as a benevolent patron who acknowledged the inalienable flow of their labour, and with 
whom transactions were embedded in social relationships and personhood (ibid: 139). 
As this shows, by shifting the research gaze from the motivations and impulses of those 
who offer to those who receive, corporate gifts become meaningful in another way.  In 
contrast to the gifts of Worldwide Diamonds, however,  in Bibiyana the corporate gift of 
programmes of  ‘empowerment’ and ‘self help’ was not met with satisfaction but the 
opposite: disgruntlement and a sense that the company was neglecting its 
responsibilities. And whilst in Cross’s South Indian ethnography the rituals of giving 
marked differences between donor and recipients in ways that were culturally and 
historically appropriate, in Bibiyana the gifts supress  hierarchy and patronage,  denying 
recipients the possibilities of long term connection with the corporation.  Here, 
corporate gift exchange emerges as an arena in which the different moralities and 
expectations of the givers and receivers clash.  Indeed, rather than the CSR gifts being 
received in the corporation’s imagined world of simple material needs and romanticised 
village life (cf Inden, 1990; Cons and Paprocki, 2010) featuring compliant villagers eager 
for ‘empowerment’, to be bestowed not by a detached though concerned corporation, 
the reality was more tricky. Not only was there considerable protest at the loss of land 
and livelihoods associated with the gas field but the CSR gifts were offered to a 
population who already had strong expectations regarding gift exchanges between poor 
people and wealthy foreigners (bideshi : foreigners; also used to refer to migrants who 
have settled abroad). These expectations were underlain by a moral economy based 
upon the central ethic of social connection and rights over land-use, which ran contrary 
to the ethics of detachment underlying the corporate gift.  Unlike Cross’s South Indian 
ethnography, in Bibiyana the exchange thus involved diametrically different ways of 
being and knowing.   
 
Moral Economies of Connection and Disconnection 
How are we to make sense of the complex responses of local people to Chevron’s 
corporate gifts? As we shall see, these gifts changed over time, as did Chevron’s position 
as giver. Though originally appearing to fit the part of a powerful patron, later  those 
charged with ‘Community Engagement’ attempted to construct the corporation as a 
concerned and benevolent presence overseeing sustainable development and 
empowerment for humanitarian rather than political reasons2.  In order to frame the 
different motivations, expectations and responses of givers and receivers in what 
follows I use the concept of ‘moral economy’  as a heuristic device. This is classically 
described by E.P.Thompson as ‘ a traditional view of the social norms and obligations, of 
the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which taken 
together can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor.’ (Thompson,  1971: 
79).  As Thompson suggests, belief in the proper working of the moral economy is often 
passionate; rebellion will result if the obligations are not met, an insight reworked by 
James Scott in his seminal work on the ‘moral economy of the peasant’ South East Asia 
(Scott, 1976; see also Edelman, 2005).  
As I will argue, within the exchange of corporate gifts in Bibiyana two moral economies 
can be discerned. The first is what I term a ‘moral economy of connection’ amongst the 
people supposed to be the grateful recipients of Chevron’s gifts.  Shaped by the region’s 
                                                          
2 As Fassin argues, humanitarianism,aimed at distant strangers with whom one has no social relationship, is a powerful 
source of anti-politics (Fassin, 2012) 
long history of migration to the UK, this involves the values and expectations of kinship 
and charity plus a strong sense of rights over local resources, gained by connection to 
the desh (homeland) via residence and kinship.  In this moral economy wealthy patrons, 
many of whom live in the UK, have a duty of charitable giving to their ‘own poor’ in the 
desh.  Within this logic, Chevron – a powerful and hugely wealthy corporation – was 
placed under similar obligations. Meanwhile the corporation’s use of the gas – a natural 
resource shared by local people - meant that it should provide payment in kind, in the 
shape of building hospitals and schools providing jobs for local people. Yet as I show in 
the second half of the paper, the CSR programmes were dictated by the logic of an 
entirely different moral economy, one which denies connection, dictated instead by 
what Cross has called ‘the corporate ethic of detachment’ (Cross, 2011), or what in the 
context of Bibiyana I call a ‘moral economy of disconnection’ (Gardner, 2012). Here, the 
corporation takes a position of concerned detachment, seeking to produce 
humanitarian social good via business but denying long term social relationships and 
submerging the hierarchy of the gift via the anti-politics of discourses of ‘sustainability’ 
and ‘self help’. Whilst analytically distinct, the differences between these moral 
economies is not always clear to those who give or indeed those who receive. Instead, at 
times they remain submerged or flattened, their sharp edges only appearing at certain 
moments or materialised by particular gifts, when the expectations of the parties (for 
particular gifts or for reciprocity in the form of gratitude) are disappointed. 
 
A Moral Economy of Connection : Transnational Migration and Patronage in 
Bibiyana 
Like other parts of Sylhet, Bibiyana has had a long and intimate relationship with the 
global economy, via the lascars who worked on British ships from the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century, the men who left for Britain in their thousands from the 1960s 
onwards, and their families who settled in the UK with them since the 1980s (Adams, 
1987; Gardner 1995; 2008)3. The migrants originally spent their earnings on buying 
land, building houses, and transforming their status. By the 1980s, they owned almost 
all the local land whilst those families who hadn’t migrated had slipped down the scale 
to become landless or land poor.  Local economic and political hierarchies were 
therefore dominated by relative access to the U.K. and other foreign destinations.  These 
inequalities took on a distinctive local pattern, adhering to kinship networks. In the 
village closest to the gas field, which was originally settled by in-migrant labourers, no-
one had the economic or social capital necessary for migration and at the time of our 
research the village was over 80% landless, far higher than the national average of 56% 
(Toufique and Turton, 2002); a high preponderance of people lived in mud and thatch 
dwellings and no-one had electricity. Our research found that many landless people in 
our study villages did not have basic food security.  
                                                          
3 For a broader history of migration and movement in the region see Amrith, 2013; Samaddar, 1999 
Despite the long term settlement of Londoni families in the U.K. transnational migration 
has continued to dominate the local economy, for transnational ‘help’ is central to the 
livelihoods of many people, either in the form of regular remittances for those with 
close Londoni relatives, or an irregular lump sum in times of need or crisis. When we 
asked the poor how they coped during crises, we learnt not only of disastrous floods, 
illnesses and accidents, but also how they were saved by gifts or loans from Londonis. 
These gifts are also extended to unrelated poor. In the U.K, for example, we met a man 
whose family fund the education of several children from unrelated and landless 
families in his village.  Such transnational  ‘help’ (shahajo) is linked to the Islamic 
practice of Jakat, in which a proportion of a household’s wealth is donated to charity 
each year. Amongst people from Bibiyana living in the UK the donation of Zakat is done 
back in the desh via mosque committees and organised around the notion of ‘our own 
poor’. A man from Talukpur who currently runs several restaurants in the north of 
England told me that he was spiritually obliged to give a proportion of his wealth to the 
poor (garib) of his village; the idea of giving charity in the UK was preposterous, he 
added, for people there were not poor.  In a similar spirit, when cattle are sacrificed in 
the Islamic festival of Qurbani Eid, a portion of the meat is distributed to landless people 
who go from house to house collecting their share. Again, Londonis send money to their 
relatives in the desh, in order that the sacrifices are carried out in their ancestral 
villages. 
 More generally, the giving of charity (dewa) is believed to create spiritual merit; 
beggars who wander from village to village are given a bowl of chaal (unhusked rice) or 
a meal. The Islamic injunction to give charity underpins a moral order in which one 
should endeavour to support and look after ‘one’s own poor’, starting with close 
relatives and extending outwards to those with more tenuous kinship connections, who 
might eventually be related only by geographical proximity: neighbours or servants 
(Gardner and Ahmed, 2009). The recipients of charity are expected to reciprocate with 
gratitude, political support and demonstrations of subservience. Centrally, the donation 
is seen as part of an on-going social relationship.  
Rooted in Islamic morality but fuelled by migration the transnational economy of 
connection has become an important survival strategy for the non migrant poor of the 
locality, who are quick to remind their patrons of their obligations (Gardner, 2012). In 
my visits to Bibiyana, for example, I, like the transnational villagers in the U.K, am 
besieged with requests for help from poorer members of the lineage that over the years 
has become my adoptive family. Whilst requests from beggars or unknown people can 
be ignored, those from poor relations cannot; indeed, I am given strict instructions by 
friends of how much I should give to which impoverished cousin or ‘auntie’. Londonis 
face similar demands.   In my last visit in 2014, for example, a new house was being built 
for a family of impoverished cousins living on the margins of the village, paid for by 
distant cousins living in northern England4. Meanwhile, unrelated poor  people who 
                                                          
4 I too once paid for a house to be built for a very poor relative (Gardner, 2012). 
have a weaker social connection make lesser demands. Take Hushnara Bibi, who came 
to the house during my visit.  In the late 1980s Hushnara had been employed by the 
family as a bua beti (servant) and had an enduring friendly relationship with the women 
of the house. Now she was suffering from respiratory problems and needed money for 
medicine. She sat on the veranda with the women of the house for a while, exchanging 
news, and then was given some money.   It is important to note that this moral economy  
of connection in which the rich are socially obliged to offer assistance to their ‘own 
poor’, in return for on-going political support and subservience (Gardner, 1995) exists 
in a context where there are only the most rudimentary and piecemeal  state welfare 
programmes, and where the poor largely rely upon NGOs for services (Lewis, 2011; 
Cons and Papricki, 2010; Karim, 2011).   
Whilst the poor seek security via patrons to whom they are connected, a major 
drawback is that the system depends upon the vagaries of individual patrons. This 
makes them particularly vulnerable in the context of rapid change and out-migration. 
Indeed, across Bangladesh industrialisation and urban migration are contributing to a 
weakening of traditional patron-clientage (cf Kabeer, 2002; Islam, 2002).  Londoni 
families from Bibiyana are increasingly orientated towards Britain, and are returning 
less. Many younger people do not feel the same amount of obligation as their parents 
towards distant kin they have only met a few times, and the weight of duty can be 
heavy. A villager who lives in Newcastle complained that the gifts and ‘help’ he had to 
distribute cost him over £10000 each time he returned home. He wasn’t going again, he 
said. It was too expensive and he had to focus on his new restaurant. The transnational 
economy of expectation is thus riven with disappointment and insecurity. 
The wider context is an agrarian economy that is rapidly changing. During my doctoral 
fieldwork in the 1980s all the households of my study village were sustained, in part or 
wholly, by agriculture. Whilst not all owned land, their members either sharecropped 
fields owned by neighbours or were employed as labourers. Payment was often in kind: 
sharecroppers took two thirds of the harvest and labourers, who had long term 
connections of patronage with richer household and were called by fictive kinship 
terms (mama : sister’s brother), were given rice as well as taka in payment, and usually 
offered longer term charitable support. Whilst fields were privately owned there 
remained a strong ethos that those within the desh should have rights of use over that 
land so long as it did not interfere with cultivation. For example, cattle might roam 
freely over large tracts of land during the dry season and ducks could swim in local 
ponds. Meanwhile after the harvest anyone might gather loose grains or straw left 
behind or in the wet season take shrimps or small fish from the waterlogged fields. 
Within the moral economy of connection these activities – so central to the livelihoods 
of the poorest people – were a naturalised ‘right’, arising from long term kinship 
connections and residence in the area. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Whilst agriculture remained central to local livelihoods, our research in 2008-11 
detailed a noticeable shift to other strategies, including rickshaw or van driving, small 
businesses and itinerant labouring amongst the poorest inhabitants. This was partly 
though not wholly due to the loss of land caused by the gas field. Many households 
complained of the high costs of agriculture due to the inputs of fertiliser, irrigation and 
labour. Absentee landlords who were based in Britain had little interest in farming and 
tended not to invest in their land, favouring the rangmati system in which the 
sharecropper has to pay for initial inputs, making it too expensive for poorer 
households. Increasingly land was being used for business ventures such as building 
‘colonies’ for in-migrants, fish ponds or poultry farms.  Accelerated by transnational 
migration, the privatisation of resources and movement of people from land-based 
livelihoods to uncertain futures has been widely reported across South Asia (cf : 
Corbridge, S. and Shah, A. 2013;  Ito, 2002; Walker, 2008: Akram Lodhi, 2009; Feldman 
and Geisler, 2012; Adnan, 2013; Adduci, 2009).  As these processes gather pace, the 
poorest people, who have no material assets and are increasingly squeezed out of the 
precarious agrarian economy, are ever more dependent upon the charity of their 
patrons.   Significantly, the gas field has altered the local ecology, meaning that some of 
the usages of land – grazing cattle, gathering grains (for food) and straw (for fuel) – 
have been severely affected. Little wonder that within the moral economy of connection 
Chevron were expected to ‘pay back’ for their use of local resources. 
 
 Anticipating Connection : Gas, Development and Disappointment 
If in the moral economy of connection help and charity are expected from transnational 
patrons, the arrival of Chevron in the area led to both to the expectation that they would 
provide compensation in kind for their use of local natural resources , as well  hopes of 
good things that would happen in the future.   Since they were extracting ‘their’ gas, 
local people argued that the corporation should repay them by providing formal 
employment, schools and hospitals, and, at the top of the list, connection to the actual 
gas, which none of the villages had.  Within the moral economy of connection Chevron 
were understood by local people as ‘owing’ them the benefits of modernisation in 
return for their exploitation of the gas. Indeed,  from the outset, the Bibiyana Gas field 
had evoked both passionate protest and hope5. The discovery of natural gas in the area 
took place in the mid 1990s by the company Occidental. By 2000 Unocal had taken over 
and a smaller installation at Dikolbakh was constructed; eventually this was to be joined 
a few miles away by a much large development at Bibiyana. The land – sixty three acres 
for the site, but more for roads - was forcibly acquired by the Bangladeshi government 
and rented to Unocal.  
 
                                                          
5 For further discussion of the ambivalence surrounding sites of industrial development in South Asia see 
Cross, 2014b 
In 2005 Unocal merged with Chevron. By 2007 the Bibiyana Gas Field went into 
production, joining other gas fields in Sylhet operated by Chevron: Jalalabad and 
Moulavi Bazaar6. Operating in Bangladesh since the early 2000s, the company is now 
the country’s largest foreign investor and producer of gas, though not without 
controversy.   For example when explorations for gas in the forests of Lawachara in 
Sylhet led to a fire in 2008, there was widespread condemnation of the company. During 
the course of our research there were also constant rumours in the national press and 
blog sites concerning the over exploitation of gas,the extent of the reserves, and 
accusations (unproven) of corrupt deals with the government (Gardner, 2012). The gas 
reserves at Bibiyana were however substantial and Bibiyana immediately became the 
largest in the country.7 Initially many people were ambivalent about the site, 
experiencing both fear about a catastrophic ‘blow out’ of the gas (as had happened at 
another gas field, Magurchhara in 2005)8 and the hope of employment. Indeed, in the 
early days of construction, many hundreds of landless and land poor people were 
employed as labourers.  More generally, people hoped that development (unnoti) would 
arrive, that the gas field would lead to connection to the global economy via 
employment and the growth of other industries around the site, rich opportunities for 
contractors and labourers alike.  
 
Bibiyana’s story should be situated within the broader picture of rapid industrialisation 
and economic growth in Bangladesh.  Indeed, the country has recently become 
something of a development success story, reaching various targets of human 
development9 and being compared favourably to India on many indicators (Dreze and 
Sen, 2013: 58-64). As Feldman and Geisler describe, rampant property speculation and 
‘crony capitalism’ are key features, as are dispossession and poverty (cf Feldman and 
Geisler, 2012; Adnan, 2013). Meanwhile the character of neo-liberal development, and 
in particular the role of multinationals in the extraction of natural resources, was 
causing serious political unrest. In 2006, shortly before our research at Bibiyana, 
protests against a proposed open cast mine in Phulbari, in north east Bangladesh, to be 
operated by Asia Energy led to the death of three and injury of around a hundred 
(Nuremowla, 2011; Faruque, 2012; Gain, 2006). Meanwhile national agitation centred 
around the content of Production Share Contracts with foreign companies, with activists 
arguing that these grossly exploit the country’s natural resources, leading to large 
profits for the multinationals, generous backhanders for corrupt government officials 
and nothing for Bangladesh. 
 Whilst the presence of foreign multinationals is controversial few would dispute the 
need for energy security (cf Islam et al, 2008; Wesley, 2006). Over 2008-11 this was 
increasingly pressing; power shortages were hampering the industry which has 
                                                          
6 The three gas fields which Chevron operates (in Bibiyana, Moulavi Bazzar and Jalalbad) contribute to around 50% of the 
country’s natural gas. The gas is sold to Petrobangla, the national oil company.  For more information 
see http://www.chevronbangladesh.com/business/#b4 (accessed 06/07/15) 
7 In 2014 the Bibiyana field further expanded and now has a capacity for producing 300 million cubic feet of gas a day. 
8
  See http://www.ijstr.org/final-print/sep2014/A-Review-Over-Major-Gas-Blowouts-In-Bangladesh-
Their-Effects-And-The-Measures-To-Prevent-Them-In-Future.pdf (accessed 6/07/15) 
9 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BGD (accessed 19/02/14) 
motored Bangladesh’s growth rate of 6.6 % (in the first part of 2010). As a report by the 
Asian Development Bank stated in 2010  ‘ …. acute power and energy shortages have 
reduced Bangladesh’s short term growth prospects.’10.  Whilst Bangladesh’s industrial 
and manufacturing sectors are almost completely dependent upon natural gas to 
produce electricity, agricultural production is largely dependent upon urea, a fertiliser 
produced from natural gas. Such was the need for energy that in the years leading up to 
our research power shortages caused riots at electricity stations 11. Despite the 
development of sites such as the Bibiyana and frantic bids to develop off-shore reserves 
in the Bay of Bengal, the country is far from achieving energy security (Devare, 2008).    
Within this context Bibiyana is a crucial part of the country’s development effort. 
Indeed, when it temporarily ceased production in June 2013 due to technological 
problems, the shortages were experienced across the country 12.  
Meanwhile during the development of the Bibiyana gas field the potentiality of the gas, 
an invisible form of wealth linked by pipelines to metropolitan centres, which could 
bring modernity and riches to those living above, seemed rich in possibilities (cf 
Weszkalnys, 20014). Indeed, the gas offered the possibility of modern and clean energy: 
no more cooking on earth stoves using firewood gathered by hand! As people  told us, 
since Chevron were taking a local resource, they should pay them back by supplying 
employment and, at the very least, connection to the gas supply. By the mid 2000s many 
of the more prosperous Londoni houses had modern kitchens, with fridges and gas 
stoves that were either powered by canisters, or left unused and unconnected to the 
gas, for whilst the potential connection was vividly imagined and desired, in reality it 
was absent. In the house where I was staying for example, the cooker installed for the 
use of Londoni cousins on their visits to the desh was covered with dust, and never 
connected to the gas that lay under the fields. They used the kitchen for storing betel 
nut and rice, my friends laughingly told me. A similar scenario could be found up the 
road on the way to the South Pad. Here, a wealthy businessman had built a gleaming 
new gas station, ready for the heavy traffic that he believed would soon be passing. 
During our fieldwork, however, the pumps were unused and the building unfinished. 
What had been anticipated had never arrived. 
Back in 2005 the anticipation of work, wealth and piped gas co-existed with substantial 
resistance to the gas field, fuelled by rumours that the gas was to be piped to India 
(Wesley, 2006: 77).  ‘Demand Resistance Committees’ were set up and a series of 
demands put to Unocal: the rate of land compensation was high on the list, as was 
connection to the gas, the provision of a school, a hospital, a fertiliser factory and 
                                                          
10 http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/BRM/brm-201002.asp 
11 11 http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Six-dead,-100-reportedly-wounded-in-Bangladesh-electricity-
protest-5196.html (accessed October 14 2010) 
11 http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-18709714_ITM 
11  http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Six-dead,-100-reportedly-wounded-in-Bangladesh-electricity-
protest-5196.html (accessed 15/10/10) 
12 See http://news.priyo.com/2013/06/23/production-bibiyana-resumes-79430.html (accessed 
18/02/14) 
improved roads.  Today, people say that Unocal agreed to these stipulations, even 
though rates of compensation, the piping of gas and development of power plants were 
determined by the government.  The negotiations took place in a context of keenly felt 
agitation: in the perspectives of landowners, they were about to lose a resource which 
sustained not only their households but those of many people around them and which 
was irreplaceable; for some it seemed almost like a loss of self. As one of the biggest 
land losers told us: ‘The day they grabbed my land, I lost my words. If I remember that day 
I have to stop myself from going mad.’   
In 2005 the road was blocked by protesters. The police were called, threats made by the 
District Commissioner, arrests made and writs issued.  Yet whilst some leaders tried to 
hold out against the inevitable, others started to negotiate. By this time the 
compensation process was underway: this was for land and property taken in the 
building of the plant and the roads that surrounded it and paid to the owners, many of 
whom lived in the U.K.  But although legally only landowners were due financial 
compensation many others were affected, for by the time construction was finished the 
local eco system was significantly altered. The high banked roads that linked the ‘pads’ 
blocked the flow of water over the fields during the wet season, leading to the water 
logging of some plots and aridity of others. Farmers noticed increased amounts of sand 
in the soil and complained bitterly about the culverts that Chevron had built : they were 
too small and had become blocked with waterweeds. The roads were also too high for 
the movement of cattle. Other people, mostly from the landless households, bemoaned 
the shrinking of the commons: less land meant fewer opportunities for gathering 
firewood, left over rice grains and fish and shrimp from fields that were no longer 
inundated in the wet season. Add to this the reduction of land available for 
sharecropping and receding opportunities for agricultural labour, and the squeeze on 
their livelihoods was increasingly painful.  In their view, they were due compensation as 
much as the landowners. 
Once the gas field was completed it was the largest such installation in Bangladesh, 
supplying over half the country’s natural gas. It also became the site of a programme of 
‘community engagement’, designed partly to quell local discontent and run by the 
Bangladeshi official in charge of Public Relations, plus a small team of ‘community 
liaison officers’ based in the gas field. The idea was that whilst the company could not 
give compensation to landless people whose livelihoods had been affected, they could 
offer a programme of community development, including that of ‘Alternative 
Livelihoods.’  Local discontent was particularly acute at the time, for the hopes of 
employment and inclusion that had existed during the initial stages of construction had, 
by 2007, been dashed.  Whilst around five hundred labourers had originally been 
employed, once the site was completed most were laid off. These men were amongst the 
most disillusioned of the people we spoke to over 2008-11. They had been given regular 
jobs and incomes, they said, until they were suddenly ‘sacked’.  With the exception of 
wealthier and politically well placed individuals who had gained contracts to supply 
building materials or labour, disappointment and anger were common during the 
period of our research.  
 
A Moral Economy of Disconnection: Corporate Community Engagement in 
Bibiyana 
Whilst within the moral economy of connection local people expected much from 
Unocal-Chevron, those in charge of the corporation’s programme of Community 
Engagement were acting within a quite different moral economy, based around 
disconnection.  As their CEO told me in 2008, if conditions changed, perhaps because 
local politics became too tricky or the gas reserves were less than anticipated, the 
company would quickly pull out. Moreover the company did not wish to take the place 
of the government or development agencies. Their motivation, he candidly explained, 
was wholly profit driven. Community Engagement / CSR was ‘good business’13 . Thus 
whilst the company stressed the values of ‘partnership’ with local communities, they 
remained decidedly aloof from actual engagement or connections with the villages 
surrounding the gas plant, working entirely through a handful of members of the elite to 
set up their programmes which were run by NGOs. Vitally, the few local people who 
during our research worked as guards or labourers at the gas field  were employed via 
contractors whilst the majority of the workforce were drawn from outside the area, and 
the community engagement personnel had little to do with the local people who told us 
that they never visited the villages, were unavailable and had never established an 
accessible office o(Gardner, Rana, Bashir and Ahmed, 2012).   
Crucially, the programmes that the company offered were motivated by the ethics of 
‘sustainability’, ‘self help’ and ‘empowerment’, key components of the moral economy of 
disconnection. These ethics effectively deny the long term social and economic 
connections  that local people feel are their due, for they are aimed at an end point in 
which support is withdrawn rather than the ongoing relationships of the moral 
economy of connection. To this extent, they can be seen as a form of disconnect 
development (Gardner, 2012). Julia Elyachar makes a similar point in her witty 
description of ‘anti-development development’ , which, she argues, is what World Bank 
officials espouse in their enthusiastic embrace of ‘empowerment’ and micro-enterprise, 
taking place in the informal economy. Here, ‘anti development development’ is a win-
win (at least for the World Bank) for it endorses the neo liberal rolling back of the state 
and structural adjustment whilst at the same time appealing to those protesting against 
globalisation and wishing to promote communities and the needs of ‘the people’; large 
scale development projects and lending are seen as ‘anti-community’ and ‘anti-people’ 
(Elyachar, 2002: 496).   
                                                          
13 Interview notes, 2009 
By 2008, when we started our research, these programmes of disconnection had been 
launched after an earlier period of gifting in which Unocal appeared momentarily to be 
acting more like a local patron, playing its role in the moral economy of connection as 
sweets and tee shirts emblazoned with the company logo were distributed at random.  
Our informants described promises being made during this early period of the good 
things the corporation would bring:  industrialisation, employment, new business 
opportunities as well as investment into schools and medical facilities.  For example, 
many of our informants described how during ‘community consultations’  officials had 
implied that the roads linking the ‘pads’ would contribute to economic development and 
attract industry.  Looking back on those days, a senior official told me that Unocal had 
made many mistakes and created ‘unrealistic expectations’ which Chevron later had to 
put right. Later I realised that this man had held the same post at Unocal so was 
responsible for all the mistakes that he was now criticising14.  
 After the gas field was inaugurated in 2007 the distribution of CSR gifts continued, 
though was now aimed at poverty alleviation and social welfare and included items 
such as slab latrines and building materials which were offered to poorer households 
whose homes had been damaged in floods15.     In 2008 Chevron’s Director of External 
Affairs explained to me that the earlier policy of ensuring financial compensation and 
‘free’ gifts had not satisfied the local population, for the money was quickly spent and 
the gifts contributed nothing to the long term development of the area. Instead, what 
was required was a programme which would support the whole community and not 
lead to dependency.  Following the global development ethics of anti-politics and 
disconnection,  the new programmes started with Participatory Rural Appraisal 
exercises in which problems were diagnosed and the field of action delineated (Li, 2007: 
246). The knowledge gained was written up in more reports, and the ‘problem’ (the loss 
of livelihoods to the gas field/ poverty) transformed into ‘project goals’.   Like all neo 
liberal development projects the solutions were technical:  community groups were to 
be formed, training in literacy and other ‘productive’ activities offered alongside 
technical, supervisory and marketing support, all deeply reminiscent of the services 
offered by the countless NGOs working in Bangladesh (cf. Lewis, 2006; White, 1999; 
Stiles, 2002; Gauri and Galef, 2005; Karim, 2008).  
Key to ‘capacity building’ was the setting up of Village Development Organisations 
(VDOs) which would involve committees of ‘local leaders’, who would choose 
beneficiaries for the credit and training. Through this mechanism a direct relationship 
between the donor and the recipients was avoided: local leaders and not Chevron would 
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 This strategy of the ‘confession’ of previous sins has been noted by other anthropologists of mining 
company CSR (Burton, 2002).   
 
15 According to literature produced by Chevron, they distributed 1,300 sanitary latrines among poorer 
households living near the field in the first year of operations, plus another 1,400 by March 2007 (Bibiana 
Gas Field : 1st Anniversary Report)  
be dealing with the actual recipients of the gifts. As a further extension of the corporate  
ethic of detachment,  an ‘Alternative Livelihoods Programme’ would be implemented by 
the NGO Friends in Village Development Bangladesh who would work with the VDOs to 
draw up lists of needy recipients.  Thus whilst the initial distributions of Unocal goodies 
echoed the largess of Londoni returnees, the VDOs directly replicated patronage 
relations. Quickly monopolised by the local elite the result was that those that had 
connections with particular patrons accessed the development gifts whilst others were 
excluded, a clear case of rural elites acting as gate keepers to development benefits (see 
Pattenden, 2011; Shah, 2010). VDOs should be elected in secret and include minority 
Hindu and landless representatives, we were told by disgruntled people left off the lists, 
a recommendation we passed onto Chevron, who later responded to these and other 
criticisms of their programmes by commenting that ‘elite capture’ was only to be 
expected16.   
Here we reach the deeply contradictory nature of Chevron’s gifts, for whilst the 
programme seemed to replicate existing relations of patronage, echoing the existing 
moral economy of support and obligation to the poor, instead of following through with 
established social relationships and charity, what they now offered were programmes 
aimed at ‘empowerment’ and sustainability, which denied the reciprocity and long term 
commitments to the poor that were core to the local moral economy of connection. 
Indeed, rather than the long established local and transnational ethic of  ‘shahajo’ (help),  
lying at the core of the Alternative Livelihoods Programme was its antonym: not help, 
but self-help. The term was repeated, mantra like, by officials in Chevron and the slogan 
‘Helping People to Help Themselves’ displayed on a banner inside the NGO offices.  As the 
Chevron’s British CEO told me in Dhaka, the locals of Bibiyana ‘are a proud people’, who 
eschew hand-outs and want to be helped-to-help-themselves. As he put it: You know … 
“give a man a fishing rod”  …17     
Yet as we have seen, the local economy of connection runs counter to this romantic 
vision of self reliant peasants made happy with fishing rods.  Rather, what people had 
anticipated were jobs and inclusion in economic growth as well as long term support 
from the corporation. Failing that, they should be given compensation, like those whose 
land had been forcibly acquired. After all, as one man put it This company have been 
taking from  our land, yet they pay us nothing!  Small wonder that the programme of 
Alternative Livelihoods was widely criticised by local people. Perhaps they recognised 
that, as Andrea Cornwall has pointed out, within contemporary development discourse 
‘doing it for yourself’ has become ‘doing it by yourself.’ (Cornwall, 2010: 3). Indeed, as 
Jonathan Pattenden describes in South India, rather than addressing the true causes of 
poverty – class relations and in India’s case the withdrawal of the state from 
development – Self Help Groups: ‘ provide low cost, highly visible anti-poverty 
                                                          
16 This comment was made to an organisation publishing a summary of the research who approached 
Chevron for a response, and transmitted to me via email in 2012.  
17 Interview notes, 03/12/08 
initiatives …. that help forestall social instability in the context of “jobless growth” and 
stagnation in the rural sector.’ (Pattenden, 2010: 509).  
Micro credit, offered to women and their micro-enterprises, is an important element of 
disconnected development, and is standard NGO fare, despite the increasing critiques of 
its outcomes (cf Karim, 2008) 18. Predictably, in Bibiyana this was the cornerstone of the 
Alternative Livelhoods Programme. Administered by the VDOs, loans and savings 
programmes were made available to small scale entrepreneurs to fund a variety of 
livelihood activities, all of which required training and were directed to external 
markets. Goat rearing, fisheries and sewing projects for women, were examples. The 
latter failed to take off; not only did the young women trained to embroider quilts 
complain of how long it took for such a small reward, but by the end of the project many 
had married and moved away.  Yet despite their shaky uptake, the initiatives had the 
avowed aim of producing self reliant entrepreneurs; With its stress on credit, training, 
and improving access to markets for those with the greatest capacity, the programme 
replicated the unspoken norms of neo-liberal capitalism, described by Ong as populated 
by : ‘free individuals who are then induced to self-manage according to market 
principles of discipline, efficiency and competitiveness.’ (2006: 4).  
The principle of self reliance extended to the idea that ‘the community’ should 
contribute to the upkeep of the development gifts. Take the smoke free chulas  (stoves), 
which I had seen discarded in Halema’s yard19.  An NGO field officer explained to me 
that to encourage people to care properly for the stoves, they were ‘sold’ to recipients at 
a cost of two hundred taka20.  In terms of disconnected development such initiatives 
encourage responsibility and sustainability.  As we have seen, however, recipients did 
not always behave as required: Halema’s stove lay unused and discarded whilst other 
people expressed anger that they had been asked to pay for the gift, an oxymoron if ever 
there was one.  Other gifts came with similar conditions. Two ‘Smiling Sun’ medical 
clinics were built, run by another NGO and partly funded by the donations of Londonis. 
These provided diagnostic services but not medicine, with a programme of outreach 
health workers, and an ambulance which could take patients to the nearest hospital in 
Sylhet, though at a cost.  Our research in 2008-11 showed that the poorest households 
did not use these services since in their view there was little point in getting a diagnosis 
if they could not afford the prescribed medicines.  Meanwhile whilst not actually 
building a school, the company provided support for four high schools in the area, via 
the funding of teachers and teaching materials, the distribution of school uniforms and 
providing several hundred scholarships for pupils each year21.  
                                                          
18 For studies of micro credit in Bangladesh see : Kabeer, 2001; Datta, 2004; Rudman and Morduch, 2013; 
Pitt et al, 2006 
19 For discussion of the role of such stoves in development, see Crewe, 1997 
20 At the time of the research a male day labourer might expect around 180 taka for a day’s work. 
21 Bibyana Gas Field First Anniversary Report, 2008: 39 
Overall, the aim of the programmes, I was told, was ‘empowerment’. As an official 
declared at a workshop on CSR in Dhaka, in which he had showed a glossy power point 
presentation of the corporation’s development gifts: “All we want to do is empower 
people.”  What did he mean?  He surely could not be alluding to the radical sense of the 
term, with its Frierian roots and objectives of political consciousness raising (Friere, 
1970). How, indeed, could he imagine that his company, which had been complicit in the 
forcible loss of land, had no grievance procedures and refused to share its social, health 
and environment impact assessments, might enable local ‘empowerment’?  The answer 
is that by using such terms the programme and its directors were attempting to elide 
themselves with morally virtuous disconnected development, avoiding the ethical 
contamination of patronage and reciprocity, but failing to recognise the complex and 
morally muddy terrain in which they were operating.  Like ‘sustainability’ they had 
created an oil company oxymoron (Kirsch, 2010; see also Sawyer, 2010).  As Cornwall 
has pointed out, in ‘Development Speak’ terms such as empowerment allow a fuzzy, 
feel-good factor; these are ‘words that admit no negatives, words that evoke Good 
Things that no-one could possibly disagree with.’ (Cornwall, 2010: 2; see also Sharma, 
2008).  More generally in the world of Development concepts which may have originally 
have carried one set of (often radical) meanings are apt to lose their way, becoming 
flattened or meaning an array of different things to different people (Cornwall and 
Eades, 2010; Batliwala,2007).  
How were these oxymoronic gifts to be reciprocated? Whilst aimed at creating moral 
virtue by avoiding patronage and on-going social relationships recipients were expected 
to ‘pay back’ via particular types of behaviour (self reliance) and collective 
performances which would add to the publically visible ethical virtue of the 
corporation. Whilst the rituals of gratitude took place in Bibiyana, including ‘handing 
over ceremonies’ in which the gift – of money, sewing machines, or even housing - was 
make public (Rajak, 2008) the pay-back for Chevron depended upon their 
transformation into merit in the global arena via reports and other literature which 
narrated success for an international audience. For example, the Bibiyana Newsletter 
produced by Chevron in 2008 includes nine photographs of handing over ceremonies, in 
twenty four pages. Amongst other good things, the report gushingly describes how for 
women whose houses had been damaged in floods : ‘Chevron gave them the chance to 
restart their lives afresh by rebuilding their homesteads’ whilst local farmers are excited 
at being trained in scientific methods (Chevron, 2008). Here, the presentation of 
romantic South Asian villages and culture, with which, it is implied, Chevron is a caring 
partner rather than a hierarchically powerful patron, comes into its own, Pieces of 
embroidery, sewn by the women of the project and offered to visiting dignitaries and 
bemused anthropologists are described as follows:  
This exquisite embroidered quilt is the product of a Bengali tradition that goes 
back a long way … it is made by rural women during their leisure, particularly 
during the rainy season or before the bitter winter invades the villages of this 
deltaic region …. Under the livelihood project of Chevron Bangladesh, women from 
the villages of the Bibiyana gas field area have taken up quilt stitching as means to 
generate income and employment 22 
 
 ‘What’s the Point?’ : Critiquing the Gift of Self Help 
Whilst some recipients were happy to perform gratitude for the corporation, others 
were less keen. For example, Khaled, who had been featured in the opening pages of 
Chevron’s globally circulated CSR Report (2007) as ‘a villager who owns a family owned 
fishing business’  told me that he was embarrassed that his photograph had been taken 
when he was knee deep in mud and wearing working clothes. He had gained credit from 
the programme and was at the time working as a contractor for the company, but 
remained ambiguous about the gas field. Meanwhile the offerings of ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘self help’ were not always well received by those  for whom the costs contradicted 
their expectations of compensation and connection.  The company was using their gas, 
people said, but they were not even connected to the gas supply. Instead, they had been 
given smoke free chulas!  This  palpable disappointment was reflected in many of our 
interviews. They had anticipated work, infra structure and modern services but it had 
not arrived. There was no school, just a programme of stipends, and no hospital, just a 
community clinic, the costs of which they had to partly cover. As one man put it: 
Chevron has established a community hospital but we don’t benefit from it. What’s 
the point if all the expenses are born by us? First you have to pay 40 taka to 
register, then you have to pay 20 taka for every visit. None of the medicine is free. 
Once I used the ambulance, but to get to Sylhet it cost 1000 taka.  
In the following analysis Chevron are placed at the centre of the ‘big disease’ of poverty 
and disenfranchisement, responsible for its cure. They are not ‘partners’, but are placed 
almost in the role of the state, their responsibility for the well being of their 
‘communities’ part of their role in the area.  
Say you have a big disease and Chevron is giving us a Paracetemol.  If the disease is 
big the treatment should be big too. You need a big doctor, diagnosis, operations, 
expensive medicine, good care and so on. But Chevron want to satisfy us by 
providing Paracetemol? 
The situation is eerily similar to that described by Welker in her account of the ‘unruly 
subjects’ of participatory development in the Batu Hijau mine operated by Newmont in 
Indonesia (Welker, 2012). Identified as a security risk by the company, local farmers 
were given training in agricultural methods in an attempt to get them to behave as 
productive farmers. Yet whilst the training attempted to instil neo-liberal subjectivities 
the farmers were unwilling and resistant to many of its participatory methods. This was 
not simply because the workshop style methods did not translate; it was also because, 
                                                          
22 Taken from a card included with the packaging of the quilt. 
as the farmers insisted, they did not want training in agriculture. Instead, they were 
dependent upon the mine which ‘owed them more than just a sense of enterprise, 
empowerment and autonomy.’ (ibid: 402) 
 
Conclusion  
Whilst to date the anthropology of the corporate gift has largely analysed the exchange 
in terms of the extension of capitalist power, important questions remain concerning 
the manner in which the gifts are received, or as Jamie Cross puts it, the ways in which 
the transaction allows donors and recipients to ‘make themselves and know themselves 
afresh’ (Cross, 2014: 140).  In this paper I have argued that one way in which we might 
frame the differing expectations, roles and relationships that the gifts involve, and the 
‘knowing’ that is revealed is via the concept of moral economy.  In Bibiyana, the CSR 
gifts offered by Chevron  over 2008-11 indicate that the corporation were working 
within a moral economy of disconnection quite at odds with the local moral economy of 
connection.  
Based on the local economy of land use, long term relationships of patronage and 
‘helping’ across transnational space, within the economy of connection local people 
expected that Chevron should act as a patron, providing services and development 
goods that were owed them in return for their use of local resources. In the longer term 
the arrival of the corporation prompted the anticipation of modernisation and economic 
growth, and all the good things that these might bring. In contrast however,  Chevron 
was motivated not only by the  ‘corporate ethic of detachment’ (Cross, 2011), but also 
the values of neo liberal ‘anti development development’ (Elyachar, 2002). With their 
tropes of self help and empowerment the  programmes of ‘Community Engagement’  
chimed with the First World consumers, employees and opinion formers  for whom 
questions of ethics and certain forms of morality are placed at the centre of ‘good’  
business practice (Rajak, 2011). Through such programmes the dubious nature of 
natural resource extraction is expiated, yet rather than being offered to people with 
whom there is a social contract it is offered to romanticised villagers and communities 
who are ‘empowered’ and freed from patronage, which, it is assumed, they wish to 
escape from.  Like other oxymorons, the gift of empowerment and self reliance carries 
considerable rhetorical power but aims to ultimately absolve the company from long 
term commitment or connections. 
It is within this context of overlapping economies of connection and disconnection and 
the shifting expectations, anticipation and disappointment evoked by Chevron’s 
presence that the paradox with which I started this paper makes sense.  When people in 
the villages surrounding the gas field announced that Chevron ‘give nothing’, what they 
meant was that Chevron had neither compensated them for their use of local gas via the 
provision of jobs and economic development and nor were they behaving like patrons, 
insisting that what appeared to be gifts should be ‘paid for’ to instil the appropriate 
values amongst recipients. By offering disconnected development, Chevron were thus 
‘giving nothing’,  for in Bibiyana, connection to people and or material benefits in 
compensation for local resource use was required. Meanwhile, rather than being given 
to the plucky and independent peasants of the corporate imagination, the gift of CSR 
was offered to a population whose deep rooted dependency on those overseas and 
passionately felt desire for inclusion and modernity, not to say connection to the gas 
and all its potential, led to protests and complaints which CSR executives, stung by the 
lack of gratitude, dismissed as the local people being ‘very demanding.’  
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